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We bound from the outside the set of sequential equilibrium payo®s in
repeated games of private monitoring. The novelty in our approach is treating
private histories as endogenous correlation devices. To do this, we develop
a tractable new solution concept for standard repeated games with perfect
monitoring: Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium generalizes the operator
approach of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) in a natural way to allow
for correlated strategies. We show that for any monitoring structure, the set
of sequential equilibrium payo®s of the repeated private monitoring game is
always contained within the set of Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium
payo®s of the analogous repeated game. Further, we explore two senses in
which this bound is tight.
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A repeated game is a stylized model of a long-term relationship. The most often
applied solution concepts for repeated games are Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) and its extension to imperfect monitoring, Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE).
In both cases, equilibrium strategies depend only on commonly observed histories.
This yields a nice recursive property that every continuation game is equivalent to
the entire game. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (APS) pursued this logic in 1986
and 1990, and thereby characterized equilibrium payo®s using methods inspired by
dynamic programming.
Many interesting applications lack a public signal and thus these solution con-
cepts lose traction. The earliest and most pointed example, Stigler's (1964) \secret
price cuts" model, studies a repeated Bertrand oligopoly model where ¯rms secretly
choose prices and only observe their own demand. Thus, the only sequential equilib-
ria in public strategies are repetitions of stage game Nash equilibria. But this misses
the potential richness of the dynamic structure | for in a non-trivial sequential
equilibrium, computing a best response often requires a complicated probabilistic
inference. Any useful recursive approach is therefore far from obvious.
Private monitoring in repeated games induces correlated private histories. In
this paper, we interpret these as endogenous correlation devices. So motivated, we
¯rst develop a new solution concept for standard in¯nitely repeated games with
perfect monitoring, and then explore its implications for repeated games of private
monitoring. Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium (MPCE) imposes a correlated
equilibrium at the start of every subgame, and has a recursive character like PPE.
We characterize its payo® set by extending the operator methods of APS, and
also develop an algorithm to compute it. We then shift to repeated games with
private monitoring. We show that for any monitoring structure, the set of sequential
equilibrium payo®s is contained within the MPCE payo® set for the corresponding
stage game. This helps us deduce the tightest bound on equilibrium payo®s that is
independent of the monitoring structure.
Our analysis sheds light on payo®s when the folk theorem does not apply |
such as when interaction is not very frequent, or more importantly, when informa-
tion revelation about unobserved actions inherently cannot be accelerated. For as
shown by Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), the discrete time folk theorem logic
unjusti¯ably yields more informative monitoring with more frequent play. This
paper seeks to shed light on repeated games with ¯xed discount factors, as in APS.
1In our attack on the problem, we explicitly account for possibilities occasioned
by correlated private histories. On any sequential equilibrium path, the contin-
uation play in any period is a correlated equilibrium, where the private histories
are endogenous correlation devices. Though incentives are harder to provide when
actions are unobserved, this induced correlation may facilitate better coordination
(as in Aumann 1974, 1987), and substantially augment the sequential equilibrium
payo® set. Our approach in fact admits arbitrary correlation each period.
We begin with a standard in¯nitely repeated game of observed actions, and
embellish it with an extensive-form correlation device that can generate any history-
dependent private messages every period. We assume that messages are made
public after players act. However, unlike Prokopovych (2006) who ¯rst took this
road, we then show that a Markovian device su±ces to describe all equilibrium
payo®s. This yields our MPCE solution concept. Theorem 1 characterizes the
MPCE payo® set | it is compact, convex, and nondecreasing in the discount
factor. Also, this payo® set contains all subgame perfect payo®s. Theorem 2 then
adds a tractable, recursive algorithm for computing it.
We next turn to a repeated game of private monitoring, and relate its sequential
equilibria to the MPCE of the corresponding repetition of the expected stage game.
Theorem 3 shows that the MPCE payo® set serves as an upper bound for the se-
quential equilibrium payo®s. We thus identify the certainly unattainable sequential
equilibrium payo®s for repeated games of private monitoring. Notably this bound
holds for all monitoring structures.
Theorem 4 asserts that our payo® upper bound is nevertheless tight in the
following two senses. First, in a private monitoring game with a doubly in¯nite
time horizon, as introduced in Phelan and Skrzypacz (2008), every MPCE payo® is
a sequential equilibrium payo® for some monitoring structure. But unlike MPCE,
a standard repeated game of private monitoring does not allow pre-play signals.
Instead, to understand a repeated game with an initial period, we modify the
MPCE concept. We compute the Nash equilibrium payo®s of all auxiliary games
using continuation payo®s drawn from the MPCE set. Put another way, this applies
the APS operator to our MPCE payo® set. Any payo® in the resulting set can
be supported as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game with some private
monitoring structure. Under either interpretation, we obtain the tightest possible
bound that makes no reference to the monitoring structure.
In contrast to the literature, which has proceeded from the inside by ¯nding
computable subclasses of equilibria, in this paper, we bound the sequential equi-
2librium payo® set from the outside. Existing work has also been motivated by the
folk theorem, studying the case of very patient players. The ¯rst analyses of pri-
vate monitoring found nearly e±cient equilibria by dispensing with all but a simple
summary of past play. Roughly speaking, these \belief-based" approaches focus
on the probability that private messages are misleading. This is possible when the
monitoring is su±ciently accurate (e.g. Sekiguchi 1997, and Bhaskar and Obara
2002). A clever and recursive set of non-trivial equilibria in which players' beliefs
are irrelevant has been identi¯ed by Piccione (2002) and Ely and Valimaki (2002),
and greatly extended by Ely, Horner, and Olszewski (2005). While the belief-free
approach can only identify a strict subset of all sequential equilibrium payo®s, it
often secures a folk theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. We gently begin with a motivational example
to which we later return. Next, we discuss in¯nitely repeated games of perfect
monitoring with an extensive form correlation device, and develop our new MPCE
solution concept. We illustrate it, returning to our example. We then formally
describe in¯nitely repeated games with private monitoring, and compare payo®s
for MPCE of standard repeated games and sequential equilibrium payo®s. Here,
we establish our payo® upper bound and show that it can be tight. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 Motivational Example
Consider a repeated Bertrand duopoly game with just two prices, high and low.
We assume a strong temptation to cheat and a large penalty for being undercut
(Figure 1). The ¯rms share the discount factor 3=4, and so are not patient enough
to support the high price in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Stahl (1991) shows
that even with public randomization, the set of SPE payo®s is the convex hull of





Figure 1: Stylized Bertrand Duopoly
Next, suppose that ¯rms privately observe a payo® irrelevant signal of consumer
taste. Before the ¯rms choose prices, each privately sees the demand for its product
3sold in the color green (g) or blue (b). The outcomes f(g;g);(g;b);(b;g)g occur with
probabilities (1=2;1=4;1=4). To simplify matters, assume players can access a public
randomization device that draws a number z from a uniform distribution on [0;1].
Consider the strategy pro¯le: \In phase 1, charge a high price after observing
green, and a low price after blue. If both ¯rms charge the same price, then repeat
phase 1. If ¯rm i charges a low price, proceed to phase 2-i. In phase 2-i, ¯rm i
charges a high price, and ¯rm ¡i mixes so that ¯rm i gets an expected payo® of 0.
If both ¯rms charge a high price, stay in phase 2-i. Otherwise, return to phase 1."
When the repeated Bertrand duopoly is extended by the color information,
these strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. The equilibrium payo® for
each player is
v = (1=4)(4(1=2) ¡ 13(1=4) + 20(1=4)) + (3=4)(v(1=2) + 2v(1=4) + 0(1=4))
i.e. v = 15=4. When called upon to charge a high price, a ¯rm will do so because
(1=4)(4(1=2) ¡ 13(1=4)) + (3=4)((15=4)(1=2) + 2(15=4)(1=4)) ¸ (1=4)20(1=2)
At the start of phase 1, both ¯rms expect the payo® 15=4. In phase 2-i, ¯rm i
expects a payo® of 0 and ¯rm ¡i expects 15=2. The payo® (15=4;15=4) Pareto
dominates the highest symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium payo® (7=2;7=2)
attainable without the information. Also, (15=4;15=4) can be attained in an MPCE
because both the information and strategies depend only on the most recent period.
This example re°ects two truths: (a) relative to public monitoring, private
monitoring may greatly expand the set of sequential equilibrium payo®s, and (b)
MPCE captures these richer information structures and the larger payo® set.
3 A Mediated Repeated Game
We begin with a repeated game of perfect monitoring G(±), played in periods 1;2;:::,
and payo®s discounted by the factor 0 < ± < 1. Each period, every player i 2 N =
f1;2;:::;ng chooses an action ai from a ¯nite action set Ai. An action pro¯le a
is thus an element of A =
Q
i Ai, the set of pure action pro¯les.1 Payo®s given
the action pro¯le a are u(a) = (u1(a);:::;un(a)). Let ®i denote the mixed action
1Throughout, subscripts will denote players and superscripts will denote periods. Let jXj
denote the cardinality of X. Also, we parse any vector x ´ (xi;x¡i). Since we consider ¯nite
action and signal sets, all functions thereon are measurable.
4for player i that chooses action ai 2 Ai with chance ®i(ai). Abusing notation,
u(®) = (u1(®);:::;un(®)) denotes the expected payo®s from the mixture ®. As
usual, this stage game has a Nash equilibrium. Let V be its set of feasible and
individually rational payo®s.
We embellish the in¯nitely repeated game G(±) with a correlation device that
sends private messages to players each period conditional on the action history.
The device makes public the private message pro¯le after play concludes each
period. Before each period (including the ¯rst), each player privately receives a
message ~ ai 2 Ai, which we interpret as a recommendation to play action ai. By the
Revelation Principle, restricting messages to recommendations is without loss of
generality.2 Players commonly observe the null history h1 = ; before play begins.
A history ht = (a1;~ a1;:::;at¡1;~ at¡1) is a complete record of all past outcomes in
periods 1;2;:::;t ¡ 1, i.e. pairs of action and recommendation pro¯les. The his-
tory ht is commonly observed by all players at the start of period t. Let Ht be the
set of all histories ht, and H =
S1
t=1 Ht the set of all histories of any length.
A (direct) correlation device ¹ is a probability measure on the set of action
pro¯les A. An extensive form correlation device is a sequence of functions ¸ =
(¸t)1
t=1 such that (¸t : Ht ! ¢(A))1
t=1, and ¤ is the space of all such functions.3
The interpretation is that after history ht, the correlation device selects an action
pro¯le ~ a = (~ a1;¢¢¢ ;~ an) 2 A according to the distribution ¸(ht) and privately
informs each player i of his recommended action ~ ai. Players then simultaneously
choose actions. Finally, the recommendations are revealed to all players, and they
become part of the next history ht+1. Finally, let G¸(±) be the in¯nitely repeated
mediated game with stage game G, extensive form correlation device ¸ 2 ¤, and
discount factor 0 < ± < 1.




i £ Ai !
¢(Ai) for every period t = 1;2;::: So a strategy assigns a mixed action to every
pair of history and recommendation. For any strategy pro¯le (s1;:::;sn) = s 2 S =
Q
i2N Si, correlation device ¸, and history ht, the payo® for player i is the present

















2In our ¯nite model, the Revelation Principle holds since there cannot be issues with the
measurable composition of functions.
3The notion of an extensive form correlation device is attributable to Forges (1986), who pro-
vided the canonical representation and geometric properties of extensive form correlation devices.
5A strategy pro¯le s is a sequential equilibrium of G¸(±) if in every period t, his-








4 Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium
If s 2 S is a sequential equilibrium strategy pro¯le of G¸(±), then Prokopovych
(2006) calls the pair (s;¸) a Perfect Correlated Equilibrium (PCE) of G(±). The
correlation device assumed in a PCE may depend arbitrarily on history. We now
introduce a simpler solution concept that yields the same payo® prediction. A
correlation device ¸ is Markovian if its recommendations depend solely on the
outcome (a;~ a) of the most recent period. Denote by ¤M the space of all such
devices ¸ : A2 ! ¢(A). Similarly, a strategy s is Markovian if it depends only on
the most recent outcome and currently recommended action ~ ai, i.e. si : A2 £ Ai. If
the device ¸ is Markovian, then there is a Markovian best response to a Markovian
strategy (cf. Hernandez-Lerma, 1989 Theorem 2.2). Thus, a pair (s;¸) is a Markov
Perfect Correlated Equilibrium (MPCE) of G(±) if it is a PCE of G(±) and both
the correlation device ¸ and the strategy pro¯le s are Markovian.
Let V ¸ be the set of all sequential equilibrium payo® vectors of G¸(±). The







The Appendix exploits self-generation methods to prove:
Lemma 1 Any PCE payo® is attainable in an MPCE.
Because every MPCE is a PCE by de¯nition, Lemma 1 implies that both concepts
yield the same equilibrium payo® sets.
Let ¹ 2 ¢(A) be a probability distribution on the set of action pro¯les A |
as realized in a PCE as ¹ = ¸(ht), or in an MPCE as ¹ = ¸(a;~ a). Fix a compact
convex set of payo® vectors W ½ Rn. A continuation value function k : A2 ! W
describes discounted future (equilibrium) payo®s for each current period outcome.
Given the stage game payo®s, the mapping k completely describes the auxiliary
game Gk. This game is (the agent normal form of) a one-shot Bayesian game whose
type pro¯le (~ a1;:::;~ an) 2 A is drawn from the distribution ¹. Each player's type ~ ai
6has the action set Ai, but the revised payo® function E¹ [(1 ¡ ±)ui(a) + ±ki(a;~ a)j~ ai]
for the recommended action ~ ai.
If the distribution ¹ is a correlated equilibrium of Gk, then the pair (¹;k) is
admissible w.r.t. W, where W is the co-domain of k. (This is not to be confused
with the range of k, which is a subset of W.) In this case,




i;a¡i;~ a)j~ ai] (1)
for all players i, actions a0
i 2 Ai, and recommendations ~ ai 2 Ai and ~ a 2 A. The
value w of a pair (¹;k) is the (ex-ante) expected payo® E¹[(1 ¡ ±)u(a) + ±k(a)].
Inversely, we write that the admissible pair (¹;k) enforces the payo® w on the
set W if w is the value of the pair, and W is the co-domain of k.
Let the set B(W) be the union of all payo®s enforced on W, so that
B(W) =
©
v = E¹[(1 ¡ ±)¼(a) + ±k(a;~ a)]
¯
¯(¹;k) is admissible w.r.t. W
ª
Equivalently, B(W) is the union of all correlated equilibrium payo®s in the auxiliary
game Gk, as k ranges over all continuation value functions with co-domain W.
The operator B(¢) has some convenient properties. First, it is monotone: If
W µ W 0, then B(W) µ B(W 0). Intuitively, the right side consists of the correlated
equilibria of a larger set of auxiliary games. Secondly, B(¢) is convex-valued: If
(¹1;k1) supports w1 and (¹2;k2) supports w2, then for all weights µ 2 [0;1], the
payo® µw1 + (1 ¡ µ)w2 is supported by (µ¹1 + (1 ¡ µ)¹2;µk1 + (1 ¡ µ)k2).
As usual, we call a set W ½ Rn is self-generating if W µ B(W).
Theorem 1 (MPCE Payo®s) The MPCE payo® set V ¤ has the properties:
(a) It is the largest ¯xed point of B(¢).
(b) It is a compact convex subset of V .
(c) It contains the convex hull of the set of SPE payo®s of G(±)
(d) It is nondecreasing in ±.
The proof is in the Appendix, but here we o®er some intuition. First, part (a) cap-
tures the recursive structure of MPCE, which is analogous to factorization of PPE.
If a set W is self-generating, then there exists an admissible pair with co-domain W.
For any w 2 W, a sequential equilibrium with payo® w can be constructed period-
by-period by replacing every continuation value with a pair admissible w.r.t. W.
This is always possible since W is self-generating.
7Next, compactness in (b) follows since weak inequalities de¯ne incentive com-
patibility. Public randomization can always be created using a correlation device,
and so the MPCE payo® set is convex. To publicly randomize between outcomes,
let us step outside the space of direct devices and consider a new device that gener-
ates two messages for each player: the original message and a second that indicates
the outcome of the public randomization. By the Revelation Principle, there exists
an equivalent direct device.
For insight into part (c), consider the extensive form correlation device that
recommends the subgame perfect equilibrium behavior after every history. By
construction, this device constitutes a PCE, and Lemma 1 guarantees that this
payo® is attainable in an MPCE. Part (c) in particular implies that the folk theorem
holds for MPCE.
Part (d) follows from the well-known principle that dynamic incentives can
induce any behavior in patient players that it can in their less patient counterparts.
The MPCE payo® set can be obtained by iterating the B operator on a seed
set W 0 µ Rn containing the feasible and individually rational payo®s V . The algo-
rithm starts by observing that V ¤ µ V µ W 0. Then either W 0 is self-generating
or B(W 0) µ W 0. Repeatedly applying B(¢) to the inequality V ¤ µ W k, where
W k = B(W k¡1), produces a strictly decreasing sequence of nested sets that con-
verges to the MPCE set V ¤.
Theorem 2 (Algorithm) The MPCE payo® set is V ¤ = limj!1 W j, where the
payo® set W 0 obeys V ¤ µ W 0, and de¯ne W j+1 = B(W j) for j = 1;2;3;:::
To implement the algorithm, we employ methods similar to those introduced
by Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003). Compactness and convexity allow us to
represent a set by its extreme points, and they imply that B(W) = B(ext W).
This makes the algorithm computationally tractable.
Let's return to the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Section 2. In Figure 2,
one can see that the MPCE payo® set is signi¯cantly larger than that of subgame
perfect equilibrium. Appendix A.6 proves that the extreme feasible and individually
rational payo®s (132=17;0) and (0;132=17) are also the highest asymmetric MPCE
payo®s. So by convexity, the symmetric payo® (66=17;66=17) is also an MPCE,
and in fact we argue that this is the highest symmetric MPCE payo®. This payo®








Figure 2: Payo®s in the Repeated Bertrand Duopoly in Figure 1. The
white area is the SPE payo® set; MPCE payo®s also include the grey area, so that
these are MPCE payo®s unattainable in an SPE; the black area represents feasible
and individually rational payo®s that are not MPCE, and thus unattainable in any
sequential equilibrium.
5 Repeated Games of Private Monitoring
A. The Stage Game. The structure here is standard, following closely the set-
up of Ely, Horner, and Olszewski (2005). As in Section 3, a repeated game is
played in periods 1;2;::: Each period, every player i 2 N = f1;2;:::;ng chooses
an action ai from a ¯nite action set Ai. But now, after play any period, each
player receives a private message mi from a ¯nite set Mi. A monitoring structure Ã
is a collection of jAj probability distributions fÃ(¢ja) 2 ¢(M)ja 2 Ag on the
message pro¯le set M =
Q
i Mi. Let the set of all monitoring structures be ª.
After an action pro¯le a is realized, a message pro¯le m = (m1;:::;mn) is drawn
with chance Ã(mja), and each player i is then privately informed of his component
message mi.
A player's realized payo® ¼i(ai;mi) following action ai and message mi depends
on the other actions only through their e®ect on the private messages. In other
words, observing one's payo® does not confer additional information. Player i's





We shall consider di®erent monitoring structures Ã consistent with the same
\expected stage game". This requires that the payo®s u(a) = (u1(a);:::;un(a))
not depend on the monitoring structure. Since payo®s depend on Ã in (2), this
exercise implies a corresponding change in the stochastic payo® structure ¼. Such
a choice is possible provided (2) is solvable in ¼i for any Ãi, and for all players i.
This is feasible if and only if the matrix (Ãi(mijai;a¡i);mi 2 Mi;a¡i 2 A¡i) has
full rank for every player i, and every action ai. This requires that each player can
statistically identify the actions of his opponents.4 This generically holds when, for
instance, everyone has at least as many messages as there are players. We assume
that this condition is met by any monitoring structure in ª under consideration.
Our results do not explicitly depend on this; it simply allows us to meaningfully
consider a ¯xed stage game.
B. The Repeated Game. Let GÃ(±) denote the in¯nitely repeated game of
private monitoring with monitoring structure Ã, played in periods t = 1;2;3;:::.
Payo®s are discounted as usual by the factor 0 < ± < 1. The game reduces to a
standard repeated game with perfect monitoring when private messages are action
pro¯les, i.e. if Mi = A and Ãi(mija) = 1 when mi = a and 0 otherwise, for all
players i. Similarly, the game reduces to a standard repeated game with public
monitoring if Mi = M for all players i, and Ãi(mja) = 1 if and only if Ãj(mja) = 1
for every pair of players i;j.
In each period, a player observes his realized action ai 2 Ai and private mes-
sage mi. Let the null history h1
i be player i's history before play begins. A private
history ht
i is the complete record of player i's past actions (a1
i;:::;a
t¡1




i ), including the null history. Let Ht
i be the set of
all possible private histories ht
i for player i, and Hi =
S1
t=1 Ht
i the set of all such





i ! ¢(Ai) for every period t = 1;2;3;::: In other words, it maps
every private into a mixed action. Let S be the space of all such strategy pro-
¯les s = (s1;:::;sn).
4This is somewhat analogous to the pairwise full rank condition of Fudenberg, Levine, and
Maskin (1994), which requires that each player be able to statistically identify the actions of
another player.
10Given the strategy pro¯le s 2 S, Bayes' rule and the Law of Total Probability
naturally imply beliefs and behavior at all future information sets. Let vi : S ! R
be the discounted average payo® for player i in the repeated game GÃ(±). While
more precisely presented in the Appendix, here we write that player i's discounted
average payo® starting in period t from the strategy pro¯le s is vt
i(sjht
i). Then a
strategy pro¯le s is a sequential equilibrium of GÃ(±) if and only if no player can
ever pro¯tably deviate, i.e. vi(sjht
i) ¸ vi(~ si;s¡ijht
i) for every private history ht
i and
strategy ~ si : Hi ! ¢(Ai) of every player i. Since playing a Nash equilibrium of G
after every history is a sequential equilibrium, existence is guaranteed. Let VÃ be
the set of sequential equilibrium payo® vectors of the mediated game GÃ(±).
6 Unattainable Private Monitoring Payo®s
A. An Upper Bound. We bound the sequential equilibrium payo®s by the MPCE
payo® set V ¤. This inclusion might at ¯rst blush appear surprising: For the repeated
game GÃ(±) has no proper subgames, whereas G¸(±) introduces a new subgame
every period. So while continuation play in G¸(±) is common knowledge, it is not
so in GÃ(±). We proceed by associating outcomes in GÃ(±) with those of G¸(±).
To do so, we replace the endogenous correlated beliefs in GÃ(±) with those from a
¯xed correlation device ¸. Also, we do so in an incentive compatible fashion.
Theorem 3 (Upper Bound) For any monitoring structure Ã, every sequential
equilibrium payo® of the repeated game GÃ(±) is attained in an MPCE of G(±).
This implies that MPCE captures the payo®s in many studied subclasses of equi-
libria. It contains all PPE payo®s for any public monitoring structure, as well as
all sequential equilibrium payo®s in private strategies (Kandori and Obara, 2006),
as well as all belief-free and weakly-belief-free equilibrium payo®s (Kandori, 2008).
The proof in the Appendix ¯rst deduces this result for PCE, and then appeals
to Lemma 1. The proof for PCE involves two steps. We show that for any strategy
pro¯le s 2 S, there exists a correlation device ¸ 2 ¤ and strategy pro¯le s 2 S
that induce in G¸(±) the same outcome as does s in GÃ(±). After the history ht
in the mediated game G¸(±), the correlation device draws a \¯ctitious private his-
tory" ht
i for each player i 2 N according to the true posterior probability of that
history conditional on the actions of history ht. The device then recommends the
actions prescribed at that private history pro¯le ht by the continuation strategy
pro¯le s(ht). By induction on the period t, we show that the distribution over
11recommendations in the mediated game coincides with the distribution of actions
in GÃ(±). In our next step, we argue that if s is a sequential equilibrium strategy
pro¯le of GÃ(±), then ¸ constitutes a PCE. For if some player has a pro¯table devi-
ation in G¸(±), then we argue that he must also have one in GÃ(±). The argument
turns on the equivalence of beliefs about continuation play in G¸(±) and GÃ(±).
B. A Tight Upper Bound. Since this upper bound is independent of the mon-
itoring structure Ã, one might think that the inclusion in Theorem 3 could not be
tight. In fact, this is true, but only because correlated play in a private monitoring
game starts no earlier than the second period. So inspired, we now exploit the
MPCE payo®s to deduce a tight upper bound for equilibrium payo®s of private
monitoring games in two senses.
Consider the repeated game G1
Ã (±) played in integer periods on the doubly
in¯nite time horizon :::;¡2;¡1;0;1;2;:::. Let V 1
Ã be the period 0 (say) sequential
equilibrium payo® set in this new repeated game. The signal generated by the
in¯nite history can provide no more than the information structure at the start
of an MPCE. In fact, we show that the space of in¯nite histories can create any
MPCE information structure.
Second, for a standard repeated game played in periods 1;2;3;:::, we can re-
move ¯rst period correlation from MPCE. An admissible pair (¹;k) is called Nash
admissible if ¹ is the result of independent mixtures, i.e. ¹ 2
Q
i ¢(Ai). We then
obtain the operator from APS, here denoted by BNE:
BNE(W) =
©
v = E¹[(1 ¡ ±)¼(a) + ±k(a;~ a)]
¯
¯(¹;k) is Nash admissible w.r.t. W
ª
This collects the Nash equilibrium payo®s of all auxiliary games formed with con-
tinuation value functions mapping into W. Since ¯rst period strategies are uncorre-
lated in GÃ(±), we use a two-stage procedure. First, we compute the MPCE payo®
set, and then use this set W = V ¤ as continuation payo®s in BNE(W).
Theorem 4 (Tightness) (a) Any MPCE payo® of G(±) is attained in a sequential
equilibrium of G1







(b) A payo® is Nash admissible w.r.t. the MPCE set of G(±) if and only if it is a





Without reference to the monitoring structure, there exists no tighter bound on
the sequential equilibrium payo®s in a repeated game of private monitoring.
In the example of Section 2, Theorem 3 demonstrates that (66=17;66=17) is
the highest symmetric sequential equilibrium in the in¯nitely repeated Bertrand
duopoly with any monitoring structure, and so all symmetric payo®s in (66=17;4]
are unattainable. In fact, except for the payo®s (132=17;0) and (0;132=17), all
sequential equilibrium payo®s are bounded away from the Pareto frontier of the
feasible and individually rational payo® set.
7 Conclusion
Understanding the equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring of actions
has long been the next frontier in game theory. Yet ¯nding sequential equilibria
here has been hard, because recursive methods only capture subsets of them. In
this paper, we have developed a new solution concept for repeated games, Markov
Perfect Correlated Equilibrium, whose payo® set can be recursively computed. We
have shown that its payo®s contain all equilibrium payo® sets for any repeated
game of private monitoring, and that this bound is tight. Bounding payo®s from
outside may prove fruitful in the future, and is currently a tractable tool for those
in applied ¯elds to use.
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Any PCE payo® is an MPCE payo®: Proof of Lemma 1
Let W ½ Rn be a compact, convex set with exterior denoted ext W. The continu-
ation value function k : A2 ! W ½ Rn has the bang-bang property if k(a;~ a) 2 ext
W for all action pro¯les a 2 A and recommendation pro¯les ~ a 2 A.
We ¯rst argue that any pair admissible w.r.t. W is admissible to ext W.
Claim 1 (Bang-Bang) For any pair (¹;k) admissible w.r.t. the compact, convex
set W ½Rn, there exists a pair (¹;^ k) admissible w.r.t. ext W with the same value.
13Proof of Claim 1: We closely parallel the proof of Theorem 3 in APS, accounting
for correlation. For a bounded set W ½ Rn, let K(W) be the set of all functions
from A to W, and K(W;w) µ K(W) the set of continuation value functions that
support w on W. The Banach-Alaoglu Theorem implies that the set K(W;w) is
compact in the weak-* whenever W is compact. Further, K(W;w) is a convex set
since a convex combination of admissible pairs is also an admissible pair. By the
Krein-Milman Theorem, any ^ k 2 K(W;w) can be written as a convex combination
of extreme points of K(W;w). But by Proposition 6.1 of Aumann (1965), this is the
same as the set of extreme points of K(ext W;w). So ^ k has the bang-bang property
as it is a convex combination of extreme points of K(ext W;w). 2
Proof of Lemma 1: Let VPCE be the set of PCE payo®s. Fix a PCE ¸ 2 ¤ with
payo® w 2 VPCE. To prove that the payo® w is attainable in an MPCE, we
show that there exists a correlation device ¸M 2 ¤M that delivers the payo® w
and is incentive compatible. To do so, ¯rst rewrite the PCE ¸ as an admissible
pair (¹;k). By Claim 1, the pair (¹;k) is admissible w.r.t. at most jAj2 points wjk,
j;k = 1;:::;jAj, elements of ext VPCE, each of which is enforced on the same set of
extreme points. Let the pair (¹(a;~ a);k(a;~ a)) enforce k(a;~ a). Then the Markovian
device ¸M with ¸M(a;~ a) = ¹(a;~ a) is incentive compatible by construction. 2
A.2 Characterization of MPCE: Proof of Theorem 1
Part (a) Factorization: First we show that if W is self-generating, then B(W) µ
V ¤. For for any payo® vector w 2 B(W) there exists a pair (¹;k) that enforces
w on W. Since W is self-generating, k(a;~ a) 2 W for all outcomes (a;~ a). Each
payo® k(a;~ a) is enforced on W. In this way, we can (by the Axiom of Choice) re-
cursively de¯ne a PCE by constructing admissible pairs ad in¯nitum. By Lemma 1,
the PCE payo® w is an MPCE payo®. Thus, W µ V ¤. Next, we prove that V ¤
is a ¯xed point of B(¢). Since V ¤ contains every self-generating set, it su±ces to
show that V ¤ is self-generating. Consider an MPCE payo® w 2 V ¤. There exists
a pair (¹;k) such that k(a;~ a) 2 V ¤ for each pair of action and recommendation
pro¯les (a;~ a). Hence,w is admissible w.r.t. V ¤, or equivalently that w 2 B(V ¤).
Finally, suppose that there exists a ¯xed point W of B(¢) that strictly contains
V ¤. Then W is self-generating, and so is contained in the MPCE set V ¤. This
contradicts the premise that W strictly contains V ¤. Therefore, V ¤ is the largest
¯xed point of B(¢). 2
Part (b) Compact and Convex: First, we want to show that B(W) is compact if
14W is compact. Since B(W) is bounded, by the Heine-Borel Theorem it is compact
if it is also closed. Consider a sequence fbjg in B(W) that converges to some b 2
Rn. Each bj 2 B(W) is supported on W by an admissible pair (¹j;kj). Endow
the space of such functions that map A £ A2 into ¢(A) £ W with the weak-*
topology (i.e. pointwise convergence). The sequence is bounded, and so by the
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem it has a convergent subsequence f¹l;klg. The weak
inequalities that de¯ne incentives are satis¯ed pointwise in the sequence f¹l;klg,
and so they are also satis¯ed in the limit (¹;k), which therefore enforces b 2 Rn.
Therefore, B(W) is closed since b 2 B(W). 2
Part (c) Contains Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs: Since the game
has perfect monitoring of actions, players may ignore the correlation device, and
instead play the subgame perfect equilibrium behavior after every history. 2
Part (d) Nondecreasing ±: We omit the proof as it is very similar to that of
Theorem 6 of APS. 2
A.3 Algorithm: Proof of Theorem 2
We establish the validity of our algorithm by extending the methods of Judd, Yel-
tekin, and Conklin (2003) to allow for correlation. Let W be the set of all convex
subsets of V , partially ordered by set inclusion. The operator B(¢) is monotone
on the complete lattice W. By Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem, B(¢) has a largest
¯xed point V ¤. Let W 0 = V and recursively de¯ne W k = B(W k¡1) for k = 1;2;:::.
First, by monotonicity V ¤ = B(V ¤) µ B(W 0) = W 1. Next, suppose that V ¤ µ W k.
Monotonicity again yields V ¤ = B(V ¤) µ B(W k) = W k+1. By induction, V ¤ µ W k
for all k = 1;2;:::;
The sequence fW kg1
k=0 is bounded and monotone, and so converges (in the
Hausdor® topology) to a point in the complete lattice W. Let W 1 = limk!1 W k.
This limit is a ¯xed point of B(¢), and by construction contains V ¤. But V ¤ cannot
be a strict subset of W 1, since that would imply that V ¤ is not the largest ¯xed
point of B(¢), contrary to Theorem 1. 2
A.4 MPCE as an Upper Bound: Proof of Theorem 3
At the information set ht
i, player i believes that the other players' private history
pro¯le is ht
¡i with posterior probability ¹t
i;s(ht
¡ijht
i), and that their period t action



















































i;s). Then player i's expected















As is well-known, a strategy pro¯le s is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there













i; ~ si;s¡i) + ±·i(h
t
ij~ si;s¡i) (4)
for all players i, private histories ht
i, and strategies ~ si di®erent from si in an infor-
mation set.
Recall that s and v denote, respectively, the strategy pro¯les and payo®s in
GÃ(±), and s and v denote, respectively, the strategy pro¯les and payo®s in G¸(±).
Claim 2 (The Correlation Device) For any strategy pro¯le s of GÃ(±), there
exists a correlation device ¸s 2 ¤ and strategy s in the mediated game that induces
the same outcome in G¸s(±) as s does in GÃ(±).
Proof of Claim 2: For any strategy pro¯le s 2 S, let ¯t (atj(a1;:::;at¡1);s) be the
induced posterior probability of the action pro¯le at in period t given the action
history (a1;:::;at¡1). The action mixture in period 1 is simply ¯1(a1) = ®1(a).
Given the realized action pro¯le a1, action pro¯le a2 occurs with chance ¯2(a2ja1) =
P

























For all action histories ht 2 Ht, de¯ne ¸s(ht) = ¯t(¢js;ht). Then, after every action
history, the recommendation distribution of ¸s coincides with the distribution of
16actions in GÃ(±). Call ¹ s the obedient strategy in G¸s(±) | namely, where every
player follows the recommendation of the correlation device ¸ after every history.
Since the device ¸s recommends the same outcome as w, the obedient strategy ¹ s in
G¸s(±) delivers the same outcome as s. 2
We must prove that obeying ¸s is a mutual best response for the players. This
follows if vt
i(¹ sj¸s) ¸ vt
i(s0
i;¹ s¡ij¸s) 8s0
i 2 S. Our approach is to prove that for every
deviation strategy s0
i 2 Si in the mediated game, there is a corresponding strat-
egy s0
i 2 Si such that vt
i(s0
i;¹ s¡ij¸s) = vt
i(s0
i;s¡i). Put di®erently, any deviation in
the meditated game gives the same payo® as some private monitoring strategy; this
cannot be a pro¯table deviation against the sequential equilibrium strategies s¡i.
Thus, vt





i;¹ sj¸s), as required.
Claim 3 (Verifying Incentives) If s 2 S is a sequential equilibrium strategy of
GÃ(±), then the correlation device ¸s 2 ¤ is a PCE of G(±).
Proof of Claim 3: By the one-shot deviation principle, the obedient strategy is a
best reply to itself if and only if there is no history after which a player would
choose to disobey his recommendation once, and return to the obedient strategy
thereafter. So, it su±ces to restrict attention to alternative strategies that di®er
from the obedient strategy in one history. Consider the history ht 2 Ht in which
strategy s0
i instead plays the action a0
i in period t. Let H(ht) µ Ht be the set of
private histories consistent with the action history portion of ht in the mediated














































i is a pro¯table deviation (from the recommendation of the device ¸s) in
the mediated game, then there exists a pro¯table deviation in GÃ(±). This would
contradict the premise that s is a sequential equilibrium pro¯le in GÃ(±). Thus,
since any strategy in G¸s is equivalent to some non-pro¯table deviation in GÃ(±),
the correlation device ¸s and the obedient strategy ¹ s constitute a PCE of G(±). 2
17A.5 MPCE Inclusion is Tight: Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Part (a):
(µ): Consider a sequential equilibrium strategy pro¯le s with payo® w 2 V 1
Ã , for
some monitoring structure Ã. By the Revelation Principle, we can substitute the
in¯nite history with the implied period one behavior prescribed by s. Let ¹ 2 ¢(A)
be this (correlated) action distribution. We can replicate the outcome of s in a PCE
by using ¹ in period one, and then appeal to Theorem 3 to capture continuation
equilibria in PCE. So, w 2 V ¤. 2
(¶): Consider a payo® w 2 V ¤, and its associated correlation device ¸ 2 ¤M.
Let the monitoring structure Ã yield perfect monitoring of actions. Following the
action pro¯le aj, j = 1;:::;jAj, each player privately observes his component of
a recommendation pro¯le drawn from Ã(aj) = ¸(aj;aj). Consider the equivalence
class of strategy pro¯les, measurable w.r.t. to the Borel set of in¯nite histories in
G1
Ã (±), that induce the distribution ¸(aj;aj) on action pro¯les aj 2 A in period 0,
i.e. the monitoring structure mimics the device assuming obedience. Select the
strategy pro¯le s from this class in which everyone chooses the action that coincides
with his most recently received private message. Then s induces the same outcome
path as the MPCE ¸, and so is a Nash equilibrium. But only by a player's own
deviation can he reach an information set o® the equilibrium path. Thus, there
exists a sequential equilibrium with the same path (see Proposition 3 of Sekiguchi,
1997). So there exists a private monitoring sequential equilibrium with the payo® w.
2
Proof of Part (b):
(µ): This direction is proved with a very similar argument as the one presented
proof of Theorem 3. Fix a game GÃ(±), and consider a sequential equilibrium strat-
egy pro¯le s with payo® v. First, construct a PCE that induces the same outcome
as s. Absent a pre-play signal, ¯rst period actions are the result of independent
mixtures, and so the PCE recommends an independent mixture in the ¯rst period.
Next, by Lemma 1 the continuation values prescribed by the PCE are in V ¤. Thus,
the payo® v is Nash enforced on V ¤. 2
(¶): We want to show that for every payo® w in BNE(V ¤), there exists a monitor-
ing structure Ã and a sequential equilibrium s of GÃ(±) with the same payo® w.
Consider one such payo® and the pair (¹;k) that Nash enforces it on V ¤. Thus, for
every action pro¯le aj 2 A, j = 1;:::;jAj, there is a payo® wj 2 V ¤ that is enforced
on V ¤ by the admissible pair (¹j;kj). De¯ne the monitoring structure Ã as in the
18proof of Part (a). So de¯ned, consider the following strategy pro¯le s in GÃ(±). \In
the ¯rst period, mix according to ¹. Following every subsequent history, choose the
action corresponding to the most recently received message." The private messages
are MPCE recommendations, so s constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Just as in the
proof of Part (a), there exists a sequential equilibrium with the same path as s. So,
there exists a private monitoring sequential equilibrium with the payo® w. 2
A.6 Derivation of the MPCE Frontier
First, we construct the device that delivers the highest payo® to one player. Let
(p;q;r;1¡p¡q¡r) 2 ¢(A) be the chances of f(pH;pH);(pH;pL);(pL;pH);(pL;pL)g,
respectively, and w1;w2 2 R2 the continuation payo®s for players 1;2. Given the
stage game of Figure 1, the highest MPCE payo® for player 1 solves
max
p;q;r;(w1;w2)2V
(1 ¡ ±)(4p ¡ 13q + 20r) + ±w1
given: (i) p;q;r ¸ 0 and p+q+r · 1, and (ii) payo®s are feasible and individually
rational, and in particular w1;w2 · 132=17, and (iii) two self-generation feasibility
constraints that players not be promised payo®s higher than can be delivered:
w1 · (1 ¡ ±)(4p ¡ 13q + 20r) + ±w1 and w2 · (1 ¡ ±)(4p + 20q ¡ 13r) + ±w2
and (iv) two incentive constraints, for when players are told to charge a high price:
(1 ¡ ±)(4p ¡ 13q) + ±w1 ¸ (1 ¡ ±)20p and (1 ¡ ±)(4p ¡ 13r) + ±w2 ¸ (1 ¡ ±)20r
Solving this linear program yields
132=17 = w1 = 4p ¡ 13q + 20r and 0 = 4p + 20q ¡ 13r and p + q + r = 1
So (p;q;r) = (13=17;0;4=17). Then the payo® (132=17;0) is attainable in an
MPCE. By symmetry, so too is the payo® (0;132=17). By convexity, the pay-
o® (66=17;66=17) is an MPCE.
One can verify that imposing symmetry of the form q = r yields a lower con-
strained maximum | i.e. a symmetric device does not yield the highest symmetric
payo®. This implies that the payo® (66=17;66=17) is the highest symmetric MPCE
payo®, and thus is the tight upper bound on the symmetric payo®s in any sequential
equilibrium of GÃ(±).
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